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Abstract One of the greatest puzzles in demographic history is why in the rich and
urbanized England, fertility declined much later than in the poor and rural France.
We consider the effects of a land reform on demographic growth by a family-
optimization model where relative per capita wealth generates social status and
welfare. We show that tenant farming is the major obstacle to escaping the Malthu-
sian trap with high fertility and low productivity. A land reform provides peasants
with higher returns for their investments, inducing them to increase their productiv-
ity and status rather than their family size. Consequently, the population growth rate
slows down, but the productivity of land increases.
Keywords Land reforms · Population growth · Status · Relative wealth ·
Sharecropping
JEL Classification O41 · J13 · N33
1 Introduction
One of the greatest puzzles in demographic history is why in the rich and urbanized
England, fertility declined much later than in the poor and rural France. This article
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considers the role of land ownership in increasing the productivity of land and lim-
iting the family size. Land reforms can slow down population growth, in particular,
where relative per capita wealth generates welfare through social status. We propose
that the land reform associated with the Great French Revolution may explain the
French-English fertility paradox.
Malthus (1798) was the first one to pay attention to the relationship between grow-
ing population and fixed land. Lucas (2002) demonstrates this relationship by human
history as follows. In primitive societies, where land was commonly owned, parents
could not improve the position of their descendants. Once the property rights for land
were established, parents could determine the optimal number of children to whom
they transfer their land. With private ownership, each newcomer decreases income
per capita, thus slowing down the desired population growth. Galor et al. (2009) con-
sider the detrimental role of unequal land ownership. Because the landed aristocracy
benefits from cheap labor, it executes its political power to retard overall education.
Consequently, land reforms trigger modernization and demographic change.
In this article, we emphasize status seeking among peasant families, which plays
an important role in population growth. Naturally, the idea of social factors dictating
the fertility choice is not new. It was a central element already in Notestein’s theory
of demographic transition (Notestein 1945) and gained space as the Princeton Fer-
tility Project indicated that the decline of fertility in Europe was mostly due to her
cultural and lingual borders (Coale and Watkins 1986). Since that project, several
authors also emphasized the role of new values established by in the Great French
Revolution (Cleland and Wilson 1987; van de Kaa 1996; Acemoglu et al. 2010;
Gonza`lez-Bailo`n and Murphy 2013). This challenged the economic drivers of fertil-
ity change being proposed by Becker (1960), Easterlin (1975), and Galor and Weil
(2000) and others.
Kurz (1968), Corneo and Jeanne (2001) and Fisher and Hof (2005) introduce
the status effect – each household is better off if it has more wealth than its ref-
erence group on the average – as a component of a household’s stable investment
function. Lehmijoki and Palokangas (2009, 2010) examine the economic and demo-
graphic growth of developing countries by a family-optimization model. Lehmijoki
and Palokangas (2014) consider the effect of land reforms on fertility, but unfortu-
nately leaning on two admittedly strong assumptions: (i) peasant families can hire
land from competitive markets at any time; and (ii) they are not obliged to pay any
compensations to their former landowners after a land reform has taken place. In this
article, we prefer to assume the following. First, landowners determine sharecropping
independently, given tenants’ expected behavior. Second, with the introduction of a
land reform, sharecropping vanishes but the peasant families compensate this loss of
income to their former landowners. This new setup is better in accordance with the
realities of the 18th and 19th centuries.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence
on the European ferility paradox from England and France. Section 3 considers the
behavior of the peasant family in a theoretical model with a status effect. Section 4
examines the effect of a land reform, illustrating the transition from the position of
high fertility and low income to that of low fertility and high income. Section 5
summarizes the results.
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Fig. 1 The decline of fertility in France, England. Source: Festy (1979, pages 266-67, 262 and 222). But
see also Bonneuil (1997) for somewhat higher estimates
2 Land reforms and the French-English fertility paradox
The French-English fertility paradox, i.e. the disparity of demographic and eco-
nomic change of these countries, has puzzled many scientists (Coale 1986; Mokyr
2005; Guinnane 2011). On the basis of historical economic data, Chesnais (1992, p.
326) argues that, before the onset of modern economic growth, the level of income
was approximately the same in France and England but once this onset took place,
income levels diverged rapidly. Maddison (1995, pp. 194–196) estimates that already
in 1820 the GDP per capita was in England almost twice as large as in France, and
that this difference only increased during the remainder of that century. Thus, if the
fertility decline was triggered by modern economic growth, then England should
have proceeded long before France (Coale 1986). On the contrary, however, Eng-
land had Industrial Revolution without Demographic Revolution while France had
Demographic Revolution without Industrial Revolution (Chesnais 1992, 327-333).
Figure 1 illustrates the fertility trends from 1831 to 1945 in England and France
showing that, in period 1831-1840, the fertility in England was over 40 % higher than
in France. In period 1831-1840, the fertility decline was well in progress in France but
just beginning in England.1 Furthermore, it took over 30 years for England to reach
the 1831-1840 numbers in France. What explains the low and rapidly decreasing
fertility rate in France?
This paper emphasizes the role of the land reform that occurred during the Great
French Revolution 1789–1799. Figure 3 presents the marital fertility rate in France
1The cohort fertility rate in Fig. 1 shows the total number of births given by women born in the time period
indicated in the Figure.
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Fig. 2 The GDP per capita in France and England from 1820 to 1940. Source: The Maddison-Project
(2013)
from 1740 to 1911.2 Figure 3 shows that marital fertility declined sharply soon after
the Great Revolution during which considerable sales of national property and shar-
ing of common land took place. As a result, the number of small farms increased and,
in 1830, landowning farmers represented 63 % of the population in France, while
only 14 % in Britain (Chesnais 1992, p. 337). This widespread ownership of land was
actually a unique feature of France.
As a consequence of the land reform, the farmers earn more from their land as they
can keep a larger share of their crop by themselves. Thus, they have more incentives
to invest in the productivity of land. Figure 2 illustrates the steady rise of GDP per
capita in France. This was slower than in the rapidly industrializing England but
yet considerable, facing the fact that France remain agrarian until the second World
War.3 Sutherland (2002) also provides data which shows that there was some 30 %
improvement in total factor productivity in agriculture during the first decades after
the Great Revolution (Fig. 3).
Per capita income can be increased also by limiting the family size. Accordingly,
the fertility decline in France was just due to the declining demand for children
among the peasants. However, there is evidence that the fertility control targeted
not only for better income but also for social rise. Cummins (2013) combines early
wealth and fertility data and observes the following: In villages where fertility was
2The concept of marital fertility is very useful, because it refers to the intentional and conscious behavior
of couples (Mokyr 2005, p.1148). Marital fertility index is expressed as the share of the maximum fertility
rate (1.00) for married women. Usually, the maximum is assumed to be one child every second or third
year. The highest fertility rates are found among the Hutterites in Canada.
3From 1750 to 1928, the per capita volume of the industrial production increased by factor 12 in England
and by factor 9 in France, while the share of the agrarian labor force decreased from some 40 % to less
than 10 % in the former but only from some 60 % to some 40 % in the latter (Bairoch 1982; Sullivan 1995).
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Fig. 3 The marital fertility rate
in France. Source: Weir (1994)
1740 1789 1839 1889
Year
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
Marital fertility rate in France
still high, wealth and fertility were positively associated, which suggests that the
desire for having children4 dominated the status effect of per capita wealth.5 In
contrast, in villages where fertility is low and even declining, this association was
negative, indicating that the status effect of per capita wealth was strong enough to
outweigh the desire for children.6 The Great Revolution eliminated the old elites
and paved the way to the new rural bourgeoisie class. This class soon realized the
potential of fertility control as a device of supporting its progress in the society
(Cummins 2013).
3 Peasants and landowners
We examine a one-good economy. The price of the good is normalized at unity in
the model. There are two agents: the representative peasant family, which produces
the good from land and labor, derives utility from its consumption, the number of
its children and from its social status determined by its wealth relative to the other
peasant families, and invests in agricultural technology to improve the productivity
of the land it cultivates; and the representative landowner, which consumes all of its
rents it collects from the peasant family.
The peasant family has L(t) members at time t . Its (net) fertility rate n is
n
.= L˙
L
.= 1
L
dL
dt
, (1)
where (˙) is the time derivative. The family improves the productivity of land, A, by
its investment I :
A˙
.= dA
dt
= I. (2)
4This is charaterized by θ in the utility function (10).
5This is charaterized by ε in the utility function (10).
6Fertility differentials between rich and poor may also refer to educational differentials (de la Croix and
Doepke 2003), but this was unlikely in the rural France.
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We normalize the area of land at unity, so that the input of efficient land equals
A. The number of family members employed in child rearing, qnL, is in fixed
proportion q to total fertility nL at any time. The rest of the family,
N
.= L − qnL = (1 − qn)L, (3)
works in the family farm. The composite product Y is made from labor input N and
efficient land A according to neoclassical technology
Y = F(N,A), FN .= ∂F
∂N
> 0, FA
.= ∂F
∂A
> 0, FNN
.= ∂
2F
∂N2
< 0,
FAA
.= ∂F
∂A2
< 0, FNA
.= ∂
2F
∂N∂A
> 0, F linearly homogeneous. (4)
In many rural economies, child labor plays an important role. We could take
this into account by extending the production function (4) into the form Y =
F(N,A, nL), where nL is the number of children. Because this would complicate
the analysis with no qualitative improvements in the results, we ignore child labor in
production in this study.
The landowner rents a farm out to the peasant family taking a share of the crop
as a return. The peasant family hides some of its crop with costs and the landowner
attempts to monitor this with costs. The interaction between these two agents implies
that, in equilibrium, the peasant family earns (net of hiding costs) a fixed proportion
α of its crop Y as follows (cf. Appendix A):
α =
{
1 as an independent farmer,
γ ∈ (0, 1) as a tenant farmer. (5)
Thus, a land reform increases the family’s crop share α from γ to 1. In return, the
landowner’s lost wealth is compensated by a debt which the family repays over time.
We assume that if a family is split into smaller families, then its debt is divided in
proportion to family members. This allows us to define the debt in per capita terms.
We furthermore assume that a fixed proportion β of per capita debt b will be repaid
at each time, for simplicity:7
b˙ = −βb. (6)
The family spends its income αY on consumptionC, investment I and repayments
βbL of debt bL. Denoting consumption per capita by c
.= C/L and the productivity
of land per capita by a
.= A/L, and noting Eqs. 2, 3, 4 and 6, the family’s budget
constraint becomes
A˙ = I = αY −C−βbL = αF(N,A)−C−βbL = [αF(1−qn, a)−c−βb]L. (7)
Noting a
.= A/L, Eqs. 1 and 7, we obtain the per capita budget constraint
a˙ = A˙
L
− L˙
L
A
L
= A˙
L
− na = αF(1 − qn, a) − c − βb − na. (8)
7If the family could reallocate its consumption over time by choosing its repayment proportion β, then the
analysis in Appendix B would become extremely complicated.
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Per capita output at time t is Y (t)/L(t) = F (1 − qn(t), a(t)) [cf. a .= A/L,
(3) and (4)]. Let the landowner’s rate of time preference be constant σ > 0. On the
assumption that the economy is in the steady state at time t = 0, the present value of
the landowner’s per capita output is F(1 − qn0, a0)/σ , where
a0
.= lim
t→0− a(t), n0
.= lim
t→0− n(t),
are the predetermined values of a and n at time t = 0. Of the present value of output,
F(1 − qn0, a0)/σ , the landowner forfeits the proportion α − γ if a land reform
increases the peasant family’s crop share α above γ at time t = 0 [cf. (5)]. Because
the family compensates this loss to the landowner as a debt, the initial value for its
per capita debt b(t) at time t = 0 is given by
b(0) = (α − γ )F (1 − qn0, a0)/σ. (9)
4 The effects of a land reform
Following Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker (1960), we assume that the fam-
ily derives temporary utility from the per capita consumption and the proportion of
young in the family, n (= the fertility rate), which characterizes the status provided
by children in a rural society. Because the peasant family saves only by investing
in land, the input of efficient land per capita, a
.= A/L, is a proper measure of its
per capita wealth. A single family has the higher status, the higher input of efficient
land per capita it has (i.e. the higher a
.= A/L) relative to that among all families
on the average, a. Thus, we augment the temporary utility by an increasing function
v(a − a) of the difference a − a.8 The temporary utility is therefore given by
u(t) = log c + θ log n(t) + εv(a(t) − a(t)), (10)
where θ > 0 and ε > 0 are the constant weights for children and status. The bigger
ε, the more relative wealth, and the bigger θ , the more children the family should like
to have. Noting temporary utility (10), the peasant family’s expected utility at time
t = 0 is
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(t)e−ρtdt =
∫ ∞
0
[
log c + θ log n + εv(a − a)]e−ρtdt,
v′ > 0, v′′ < 0, v′(0) = 1, ρ > 0, θ > 0, (11)
where the constant ρ > 0 is the family’s rate of time preference.
The status-effect (as characterized by the parameter ε) plays a crucial role in the
model, and we assume that it is strong enough relative to the desire for having chil-
dren (as characterized by the parameter θ ) so that the following inequality holds
true:
ε
θ
> max
[
1
a
,
1
a
1 − qn
qn
]
,
(12)
8This specification is chosen for simplicity. If the measure v were a linearly homogeneous function of a
and a, we would obtain the same results with some complication.
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where 1
a
is labor per efficient land and 1−qn
qn
the ratio of labor in production relative
to labor in child rearing. In addition, we assume that the repayment rate β of the debt
is slow enough for
β <
(
1 − η
θ
)
σ with
η
.= nFN(N,A)
F (N,A)
∂N
∂n
= −nFN(N,A)
F (N,A)
qL = −qnFN(1 − qn, a)
F (1 − qn, a) < 0, (13)
where σ is the landowner’s rate of time preference, θ the peasant family’s weight for
children [cf. (11)] and η the elasticity of output Y with respect to the birth rate n,
holding efficient land A constant [cf. (3) and (4)].
A land reform increases the peasant family’s crop share α from γ ∈ (0, 1) to 1.
First, we consider the effect of α on the assumption that α ∈ [γ, 1] is a continuous
variable. The reform increases both the crop share α and the initial debt (9) for the
family at time t = 0. The family then maximizes its utility (11) by choosing its
fertility n and consumption per capita, c, subject to its budget constraint (8) and the
repayment of debt, (6). Conditional on assumptions Eqs. 12 and 13, the solution of
this maximization leads to the following results (cf. Appendix B):
da∗
dα
> 0,
dn∗
dα
< 0, (14)
where a∗ and n∗ are the steady-state values for a and n. The results (14) can be
rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 In the long run, a marginal increase of the peasant family’s crop share
α increases per capita efficient land a∗, but decreases the fertility rate n∗.
Because results (14) hold for all values α ∈ [γ, 1], Proposition 1 can be
generalized for the discrete choice α ∈ {γ, 1} as well:
Proposition 2 In the long run a land reform, where a tenant farmer with α = γ < 1
becomes an independent farmer with α = 1, increases per capita efficient land a∗,
but decreases the fertility rate n∗.
An increase of the crop share α raises the rate of return for investment in land.
This promotes the family’s incentives to transfer resources from child rearing to
investment in land.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the effects of a land reform by a family-optimization model
that contains status seeking through the accumulation of relative per capita wealth.
In such a case, the reform generates a higher rate of return to investment for peasant
families. The outcome of this depends on preferences. If the appreciation of the social
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status from relative wealth is strong enough, then peasants limit their family size and
invest in the improvement of land.
The puzzling demographic history in Europe provides supportive evidence for the
land-reform hypothesis. Because of the land reform in the Great French Revolution
1789–1799, fertility declined in in the poor and rural France much earlier than in the
rich and urbanized England.
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Appendix A: Sharecropping
In many agricultural economies, the landowner rents a farm by taking a share of the
crop as a return. Since Stiglitz (1974) and Newbery (1977), economists explained this
behavior by optimal risk-sharing contracts. On the basis of Strulik and Weisdorf’s
(2008) growth model, Vollrath (2012) built up a theory where a landowner makes a
decision between fixed rent, fixed wage and sharecropping contracts to hire tenants.
He showed that a fixed wage contract elicits the lowest and a fixed rent contract
the highest fertility, with sharecropping being the intermediate case. He, however,
assumed that peasants cannot improve the productivity of land and that agricultural
labor can freely shift to the industrial sector, which was hardly possible in the 19th
century. In our article, the peasant families are liquidity-constrained, having no option
to move elsewhere. Thus, they have to allocate their labor between production and
child rearing and finance improvements in the productivity of land by their personal
savings.
We assume that the peasant family is able to hide some of its crop Y at cost E,
but the landowner can increase this cost E by allocating resources M to monitoring
and policing. Let ξY be the hidden crop and (1 − ξ)Y the revealed crop, where
ξ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the size of the family does not affect the ability to conceal
the crop, but that such activity is subject to increasing costs. This means that the cost
of hiding crop, E, is proportional to total crop Y , but increasing with respect to the
ratio ξ
.= E/Y of hidden to total crop and the ratio m .= M/Y of motoring costs to
total crop Y . With the whole crop revealed, ξ = 0, there is no cost, E = 0. Given
these assumptions, we obtain the cost function
E = s(ξ,m)Y, ∂s
∂ξ
> 0,
∂s
∂m
> 0, s(0,m) = 0, (15)
where s is the ratio of the cost E to total crop Y . We assume that the function s(ξ,m)
twice differentiable, for convenience.
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If the landowner obtains the share χ ∈ [0, 1] of the revealed crop (1 − ξ)Y , then
its rents amount to
Υ
.= χ(1 − ξ)Y. (16)
The peasant family earns crop Y minus rents (16) and hiding costs (15):

.= Y − Υ − E = [1 − (1 − ξ)χ − s(ξ,m)]Y. (17)
It maximizes its income (17) by its hiding proportion ξ , given cropsharing χ , mon-
toring costs m and total crop Y . The first-order condition ∂/∂ξ = 0 is equivalent
to χ = ∂s
∂ξ
(ξ,m). Differentiating this totally, we obtain the response function of the
peasant family as follows:
ξ(χ,m),
∂ξ
∂χ
= 1
/
∂2s
∂ξ2
,
∂ξ
∂m
= − ∂
2s
∂ξ∂m
/
∂2s
∂ξ2
. (18)
The landowner earns rents (16) minus monitoring costs M = mY . Given the
response function (18), this target becomes
Υ
.= χ(1 − ξ)Y − M = [χ − ξ(χ,m)χ − m]Y. (19)
The landowner maximizes (19) by cropsharing χ and the ratio m of monitoring cost
to total crop, given total crop Y . This implies that both χ and m (and also ξ ) are
constants:
(χ,m) = argmax
χ,m
Υ = argmax
χ,m
[χ − ξ(χ,m)χ − m].
Given Eqs. 17 and 18, the income of the peasant family (net of hiding costs)
relative to total crop is then a constant
γ
.= Π/Y = 1 − (1 − ξ)χ − s(ξ,m) ∈ (0, 1).
Because an independent farmer has neither hiding costs ξ nor the landowner’s claims
χ , it earns total crop Π
∣∣
ξ=χ=0= [1 − s(0,m)]Y = Y [cf. (15) and (17)].
Appendix B: Results (14)
With the definition of the variable k(t)
.= b(t)/(α − γ ), we can transform the
differential equations (8) and b˙ = −βb [cf. (6)] into
a˙ = αF(1 − qn, a) − c − (α − γ )βk − na, a(0) = a0, α > γ,
k˙ = −βk, k(0) = F(1 − qn0, a0)/σ, (20)
where a0 and n0 are the initial steady-state values of a and n. The family maxi-
mizes (11) by c and n subject to Eq. 20 at each moment of time. This leads to the
Hamiltonian
H = log c+θ log n+v(a−a)+λ[αF(1−qn, a)−c−(α−γ )βk−na]−ζβk, (21)
where the co-state variables λ and ζ evolve according to
λ˙=ρλ − ∂H
∂a
=[ρ+n−αFA(1−qn, a)]λ−εv′(a−a), lim
t→∞ λae
−ρt =0,(22)
ζ˙ = ρζ − ∂H
∂k
= (ρ + β)ζ + (α − γ )βλ, lim
t→∞ ζke
−ρt = 0. (23)
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The maximization of the Hamiltonian (21) by the control variables (c, n) for given
λ and ζ yields the first-order conditions
∂H
∂c
= 1
c
− λ = 0, ∂H
∂n
= θ
n
− [αqFN(1 − qn, a) + a]λ = 0. (24)
Because the right-hand equation in Eq. 24 establishes a one-to-one correspondence
from λ to n, we can replace λ by the fertility rate n as the co-state variable. Further-
more, by the left-hand equation in Eq. 24, we can define per capita consumption c as
a function of a and n:
c
.= 1/λ = z(a, n, α)/θ > 0, z(a, n, α) .= [αqFN(1 − qn, a) + a]n > 0,
za
.= ∂z
∂a
= (αqFNA︸︷︷︸
+
+ 1)n > 0, zn .= ∂z
∂n
= αqFN︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+a − αq2nFNN︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
zα
.= ∂z
∂α
= qnFN(1 − qn, a) > 0, z = zαα + an > zαα. (25)
Because the production function F(N,A) is linearly homogenous [cf. (4)], its partial
derivatives FN and FA are homogeneous of degree zero. From this, Eqs. 3, 12 and 25
it follows that
0 = (NFNN + AFNA)/L = (1 − qn)FNN + aFNA, FNN = − a
1 − qnFNA,
0 = (NFNA + AFAA)/L = (1 − qn)FNA + aFAA, FAA = −1 − qn
a
FNA,
−αFAA
za︸︷︷︸
+
= −α
n
FAA
1 + αqFNA =
α
na
(1 − qn)FNA
1 + αqFNA =
α
an
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 − qn
1/FNA︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+αq <
α
an
1 − qn
αq
= 1
a
1 − qn
qn
<
ε
θ
, αFAA + za ε
θ
> 0, (26)
ε
θ
zn − αqFNA − 1 > ε
θ
(a − αq2nFNN) − αqFNA − 1
= ε
θ
a︸︷︷︸
>1
− ε
θ
αq2nFNN − αqFNA − 1
> − ε
θ
αq2nFNN − αqFNA =
(
− ε
θ
qn
FNN
FNA
− 1
)
αqFNA
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
ε
θ
qna
1 − qn − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠αq FNA︸︷︷︸
+
> 0. (27)
Plugging the function (25) into (20) yields the differential equations
a˙ = αF(1 − qn, a) − z(a, n, α)/θ − (α − γ )βk − na, k˙ = −βk. (28)
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Given Eqs. 13, 20 and 25, the first-equation in Eq. 28 has the properties:
∂a˙
∂n
= −αqFN(1 − qn, a) − a − zn
θ
= − z
n
− zn
θ
< 0,
∂a˙
∂a
= αFA(1 − qn, a)
−n − za
θ
,
∂a˙
∂α
= F(1 − qn, a) − zα
θ
− βk = F(1 − qn, a)
[
1 − qn
θ
FN(1 − qn, a)
F (1 − qn, a)
− βk
F(1 − qn, a)
]
= F(1− qn, a)
[
1− η
θ
− βk
F(1 − qn, a)
]
=F(1 − qn, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1 − ηθ −
β
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎠> 0,
∂a˙
∂k
= (γ − α)β < 0. (29)
On the assumption that all peasant families are identical, efficient land per family
member is uniform in the economy, a = a, in equilibrium. Given a = a, Eqs. 11 and
25, we can transform the differential (22) into
ρ + n − αFA(1 − qn, a) − ε
θ
z(a, n, α) = ρ + n − αFA(1 − qn, a) − ε
λ
= ρ + n − αFA(1 − qn, a) − v′(0) ε
λ
= λ˙
λ
= d log λ
dt
= − d
dt
log z(a, n) = −za
z
a˙ − zn
z
n˙. (30)
Rearranging terms in Eq. 30, and noting Eqs. 25 and 29, we obtain the differential
equation
n˙ = z
zn
[
αFA(1 − qn, a) + ε
θ
z(a, n, α) − n − ρ
]
− za
zn
a˙ (31)
with partial derivatives
∂n˙
∂a
= z
zn
(
αFAA + ε
θ
za
)
− za
zn
∂a˙
∂a
,
∂n˙
∂n
= z
zn
( ε
θ
zn − αqFNA − 1
)
− za
zn
∂a˙
∂n
,
∂n˙
∂α
∣∣∣∣
a˙=n˙=0
= z
zn
(
FA + ε
θ
zα
)
− za
zn
∂a˙
∂α
. (32)
Finally, solving for λ from the right-hand equation in Eq. 24, and plugging it into
Eq. 23 yields the differential equation
ζ˙ = (ρ + β)ζ + (α − γ )θβ/n
αqFN(1 − qn, a) + a . (33)
We have a system of four differential Eqs. 28, 31 and 33 with predetermined vari-
ables a and b, jump variables n (representing λ) and ζ and the parameters α and b(0).
Given the production function y = F(1−qn, a) [cf. (4)], per capita efficient land a is
always positive. Given the first-order conditions (24), per capita consumption c, the
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fertility rate n and the co-state variable λ are always positive. Given the right-hand
equation in Eq. 28, limt→∞ b = 0. Finally, given Eq. 23, ζ
∣∣
ζ˙=0= −βλ/(ρ +β) < 0.
Thus, the values of a, b, n and ζ in the steady state a˙ = b˙ = n˙ = ζ˙ = 0 are
a∗ > 0, b∗ = 0, n∗ > 0, ζ ∗ < 0.
At time t = 0, the system Eqs. 28, 31 and 33 faces an increase of the family’s crop
share α from γ to 1. That system can be linearized in the neighborhood of the steady
state (a∗, b∗, n∗, ζ ∗) [cf. (29) and (32)]:
0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂k
∂a˙
∂n
∂a˙
∂ζ
∂k˙
∂a
∂k˙
∂k
∂k˙
∂n
∂k˙
∂ζ
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂k
∂n˙
∂n
∂n˙
∂ζ
∂ζ˙
∂a
∂ζ˙
∂k
∂ζ˙
∂n
∂ζ˙
∂ζ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
da
dk
dn
dζ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ +
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂a˙
∂α
∂k˙
∂α
∂n˙
∂α
∂ζ˙
∂α
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ dα =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂b
∂a˙
∂n
0
0 −β 0 0
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂b
∂n˙
∂n
0
∂ζ˙
∂a
∂ζ˙
∂b
∂ζ˙
∂n
ρ + β
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
da
dk
dn
dζ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂a˙
∂α
0
∂n˙
∂α
∂ζ˙
∂α
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ dα. (34)
We assume that the system has a saddle point: there is only one initial value n(0)
for the jump variable n and one intial value ζ(0) for the jump variable ζ , so that
the system converges to the steady state (a∗, k∗, n∗, ζ ∗). The saddle-point condition
requires that the system must have two positive and two negative roots. The roots of
this system μ1, μ2, μ3 and μ4 can be solved from the equation
0 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
− μ ∂a˙
∂b
∂a˙
∂n
0
0 −β − μ 0 0
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂b
∂n˙
∂n
− μ 0
∂ζ˙
∂a
∂ζ˙
∂b
∂ζ˙
∂n
ρ + β − μ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −(β + μ)(ρ + β − μ)
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
− μ ∂a˙
∂n
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂n
− μ
∣∣∣∣
.
The first two roots are μ1 = −β < 0 and μ2 = ρ + β > 0. The remaining two roots
μ3 and μ4 have different signs, if the determinant of the Jacobian for the subsystem
of two equations a˙ = 0 and n˙ = 0 is negative [cf. (26), (27) and (29)]:
0 >
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂n
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂n
z
zn
(
αFAA + εθ za
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂a
z
zn
(
ε
θ
zn − αqFNA − 1
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
= z
zn
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂n
αFAA + εθ za εθ zn − αqFNA − 1
∣∣∣∣
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎝ εθ zn − αqFNA − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ∂a˙∂a −
⎛
⎜⎜⎝αFAA + εθ za︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ∂a˙∂n︸︷︷︸
−
.
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This implies that the Jacobian of the whole system has a positive sign,
J .=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂b
∂a˙
∂n
0
0 −β 0 0
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂b
∂n˙
∂n
0
∂ζ˙
∂a
∂ζ˙
∂b
∂ζ˙
∂n
ρ + β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −(ρ + β)β
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂n
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0, (35)
and that
∂a˙
∂a
<
(
ε
θ
zn − αqFNA − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1(
αFAA + ε
θ
za︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
∂a˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
−
< 0. (36)
Noting Eqs. 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 35 and 36, we obtain
da∗
dα
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂α
∂a˙
∂b
∂a˙
∂n
0
0 −β 0 0
∂n˙
∂α
∂n˙
∂b
∂n˙
∂n
0
∂ζ˙
∂α
∂ζ˙
∂b
∂ζ˙
∂n
ρ + β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂α
∂a˙
∂n
∂n˙
∂α
∂n˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂α
∂a˙
∂n
z
zn
(
FA + εθ zα
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂α
z
zn
(
ε
θ
zn − αqFNA − 1
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
z
zn
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂α
∂a˙
∂n
FA + εθ zα εθ zn − αqFNA − 1
∣∣∣∣= βJ (ρ + β)
z
zn︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∣∣∣∣ + −+ +
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0,
dn∗
dα
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂b
∂a˙
∂α
0
0 −β 0 0
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂b
∂n˙
∂α
0
∂ζ˙
∂a
∂ζ˙
∂b
∂ζ˙
∂α
ρ + β
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂α
∂n˙
∂a
∂n˙
∂α
∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
∣∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂α
z
zn
(
αFAA + εθ za
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂a
z
zn
(
FA + εθ zα
) − za
zn
∂a˙
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
= βJ (ρ + β)
z
zn
∣∣∣∣
∂a˙
∂a
∂a˙
∂α
αFAA + εθ za FA + εθ zα
∣∣∣∣ = βJ (ρ + β)
z
zn︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∣∣∣∣ − ++ +
∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0.
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